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The ALTEC-conducted Spacegate feasibility study addresses the opportunities offered by the sub- orbital flight 
with special emphasis to future generation transportation. Pursuing the same systemic methodology of the initial 
Spacegate definition activities, this paper focuses on some specific aspects of suborbital operations and outlines a top 
level end-to-end operating cycle for a reference suborbital mission spanning from pre-flight, to flight, re-entry and 
post landing operations and associated Ground Segment. Special focus is given to identification of suitable locations 
in Italy for suborbital operations, and to liftoff and re-entry phases; the results of specific simulations are also 
reported, showing some lift off options and the feasibility of the spiral shaped descent maneuver that improves the 
pilot controllability of the vehicle during the re-entry phase. Further, this paper outlines  within the selected reference 
mission, the main safety aspects considered as driving factors in planning and implementing future generation 
transportation; areas such as launch/landing range and relevant risk management/mitigation policies, as well as 
selection of safety driving criteria in the definition of trajectories and space transition corridors, and capabilities to 
monitor the vehicle ascent and re-entry will be assessed. Safety regulations will also be evaluated to protect launch 
range, drive spaceport site selection and consequently the ability of the spaceport to accommodate large numbers of 
passengers and participants, as well as a number of simultaneous operations such as training, vehicle integration 
tasks, and passenger preparation for flight. For human flight in general, and in particular for commercial point to 
point activities at this early stage, it is vital to minimize risk since a fatal accident at the very beginning of flights will 
put the entire business in jeopardy. The regulatory challenges with regards to safety will also be outlined in this 
paper, related to executing Spacegate activities in Europe and collaborations with the involved Agencies in the USA 
and Europe (FAA, ENAC, ENAV, SESAR, EASA) will be explored; in particular, some initiatives have already 
been started, that include active ALTEC participation to the IAASS Space Safety Technical Committee (SSTC) that 
was created to contribute to the advancement of the Safety in the area of the “Commercial Suborbital Flight". 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper describes some of the main aspects 
involved in planning a point-to-point suborbital flight 
and the relevant operations, as well as the major 
driving safety guidelines. Some of the major aspects 
affecting the development of an overall mission 
scenario will be considered, which can further be 
investigated in subsequent research work. The 
development of a reference suborbital mission flow, 
both for flight and ground operations, and the 
description of the interaction with Safety throughout 
the whole process, is the initial step toward the 
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definition of a proper activity plan and the associated 
ground support. In particular, Spaceports as takeoff , 
landing and ground processing /passengers facilities 
are not supposed to be built from scratch, but at least 
initially will be based on existing sites, perhaps with 
specific future upgrades. The Spacegate overall 
system approach is shown in Fig. I, where the major 
components are identified, namely Research and 
Analysis, Technology, Ground Segment,  Regulatory 
and Certification. All the aspects identified in this 
paper are related to the components in Fig.1 
 
 
Fig.I:   Spacegate Overall System Approach 
 
II. SITES SELECTION 
II.I Departure and landing Spaceports  
       As already pointed out in [1], the Spacegate 
concept is based upon the usage of existing ground 
infrastructures and facilities, which would be assessed 
for possible upgrades, if needed. A Spaceport is a 
launch/landing site where hypersonic vehicles can 
take-off, cross both the aeronautic and the high 
altitude domains, in order to reach the space domain, 
and re-enter in the atmosphere through sub-orbital or 
parabolic flights. In the Spacegate study, Spaceport 
does not mean building brand new infrastructures, but 
rather making the most of existing sites, possibly with 
selected upgrades to fulfill the operating 
requirements. For parabolic flights, the launch 
Spaceport is the same of the re-entry one; for sub-
orbital flights, because of the horizontal component of 
the velocity vector, the re-entry Spaceport differs 
from the launch one. The site selection derives from 
evaluations performed as part of the Ground Segment 
activities shown in Fig. I. As an example of the 
evaluations performed therein, the Decimomannu 
military airport in Sardinia, whose location is shown 
in Fig.II, has specific favorable aspects, mostly 
related to surrounding landscape, vicinity of cities or 
populated areas (noise and debris impact), weather, 
airport dimensions, commercial and scheduled flights, 
available runways and dimensions, available 
Navigational Aid System (Navaids), airspace type 
and dimensions, prohibited, restricted and dangerous 
areas, military activities. The airport is included in the 
Cagliari Class C / D Airspace and, specifically, inside 
the CTR – Zone 1. There are some constraints in the 
usage of the Decimomannu airport, due to prohibited, 
restricted and dangerous areas, as  listed herein: 
The Decimomannu Airport is close to the following 
classified areas:  
 R 54 – Oristano  
From SFC to FL600: Heavy military air 
activity and target towing training  
HR: Mon-Fri, H24  
 R 59 – Capo Frasca  
From SFC to FL150: Air/Ground Firing exercise  
HR: Mon-Fri, H24  
 D40A – Decimomannu  
From 1000’ AMSL to UNL: Air to Air firing and 
Combat training  
HR: Mon-Fri HJ+/-30’ 
 
 
Fig. II, Decimomannu Airport Location 
 
This last area, specifically, covering the airspace 
from 1000’ AMSL to UNL, could allow the mission 
profile of a typical Sub-orbital spaceflight, without 
interfere with Commercial or General Aviation flights 
or Airways. 
Light: HIRL, REIL, PAPI, ABN, ALS RWY 17L  
TACAN: CH 019X DEC  
NDB: 331 DEC  
Fuel: JP-8  
Fire Fighting: Cat 8 ICAO  
Another site that is a good candidate for suborbital 
operations in Italy is the Taranto Grottaglie Airport in 
Puglia. The following paragraphs will provide more 
detailed information on both airports 
 
II.II Decimomannu Airport Characteristics 
The main characteristics and the map of the 
Decimomannu Military Airport are summarized in 
Fig. III and Fig. IV respectively. 
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Fig. III, Decimomannu Airport Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.IV: Decimomannnu Airport Map 
 
II.III Taranto Grottaglie Airport Characterisctics 
The Taranto-Grottaglie "Marcello Arlotta" Airport 
(Italian: Aeroporto di Taranto-Grottaglie "Marcello 
Arlotta") (IATA: TAR, ICAO: LIBG), serves Taranto 
and Grottaglie, both located in the province of 
Taranto in Italy. The airport is located 1.5 km (0.8 
NM) from the city of Monteiasi, 4 km (2.2 NM) from 
Grottaglie and 16 km (8.6 NM) from Taranto. It is 
named for Marcello Arlotta (1886-1918), an Italian 
aviator. The airport is used for general aviation, with 
no commercial airline service. Fig. V and Fig VI 
show the map location of the Taranto Grottaglie 
Airport 
 
 
Fig.V: Taranto Grottaglie Airport Location 
 
Fig.VII is a summary of the main characteristics of 
the Taranto Grottaglie airport. There are potentially 
other locations in Italy suitable for suborbital 
operations, in particular the Military Airport of 
Pratica di Mare (IATA: QLY, ICAO:LIRE)  
 
 
Fig.VI: Taranto Grottaglie Airport Map 
 
 Fig.VII : Taranto Grottaglie Airport Characteristics 
 
III. LAUNCH OPTIONS 
The Spacegate study considers the following two 
launch options: 
 Horizontal Single-Stage-to-Orbit (SSTO) 
Launch: The majority of SSTO concepts will 
take off horizontally from a conventional runway 
like the Decimomannu runway and transition 
immediately to the vertical ascent. These 
operations will be entirely contained within 
reserved airspace.  
 Horizontal Two-Stage-to-Orbit (TSTO) Launch: 
Some RLV concepts call for the vehicle to be 
taken to an airborne launch point by a ferry 
aircraft. Some of these first-stage aircraft are 
piloted, and some operate autonomously. The 
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piloted ferry aircraft may operate outside of 
reserved airspace while en route to and from the 
airborne launch point. Autonomous first-stage 
aircraft would be required to remain within 
reserved airspace.  
Fig.VIII shows a pictorial view of a parabolic flight 
profile based on horizontal takeoff and landing 
 
Fig. VIII: Pictorial view of a parabolic flight profile 
 
IV. MISSION FLOW 
A Suborbital Mission Operations flow can be 
described by the flow chart of Fig. IX, that shows the 
typical operations phases. Every phase will have to be 
further detailed depending upon the selected vehicle 
and the relevant mission configuration. It is initially 
assumed that the takeoff and reentry phase occur 
horizontally  on an airport runway. 
  
 
Fig.IX: Suborbital Mission Operations Flow 
 
A specific Ground Segment will have to be defined to 
properly provide the functional capabilities to support 
the mission both on ground and on flight. This 
includes the ground facilities and tools that support 
the operations at the Spaceports, the Spacegate 
Control Center, the Ground Stations deployed as 
appropriate along the planned trajectory to track the 
vehicle and the associated communication network. 
For reference purposes only, Fig.X  shows the 
Ground Segment of the ESA Intermediate Experiment 
Vehicle, IXV. A top level preliminary description of 
the main functions associated with the Spacegate 
Control Center is provided in paragraph IX. The 
following paragraphs provide a more detailed 
description of the various mission phases.  
 
Fig.X: Ground Segment of the IXV Mission 
 
V. PRE-LAUNCH  
Pre-launch operations include all the activities that 
need to be accomplished to prepare the vehicle for 
flight. In general the vehicle will undergo specific 
preflight checkout to verify the correct behavior of all 
the subsystems and equipment. The latter activities 
depend upon the selected launch option and are 
supported by specific Ground Support Equipment. 
Subsequent prelaunch operations include vehicle 
fueling, on-loading food and other perishable items, 
and boarding crew and passengers. Fuel shall be 
supplied  to the spacecraft via an automated umbilical 
and underground piping network from the fuel 
storage facility. Launch-support services facilities 
provide consumables for passenger/crewed flights 
and should be delivered to the flight vehicle at pre-
launch and removed at landing/recovery. Fig. XI 
describes the functional decomposition of the Pre-
launch activities block shown in Fig.IX. In future 
works, this decomposition shall further be developed 
to derive the relevant lower level system 
requirements. 
 
 
Fig. XI: Prelaunch activities Operations Flow 
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Flight-support services facilities include all the 
relevant buildings, operations and equipment 
necessary to maintain the spaceport and could be 
located either on-site or remote from the launch 
complex. The relevant operations encompass all the 
functions required to control the spaceport facility 
including facility management, flight control and 
planning, communications, security, and emergency 
services.  
 
VI. LAUNCH 
This paragraph shows some preliminary results of 
specific simulations of flight dynamics laws on the 
longitudinal plane [2] for a winged, Single-Stage-To-
Orbit (SSTO) system, taking off from a runway.  
The developed simulation tool is flexible enough to 
simulate the ascent for both SSTO and TSTO 
systems, providing as output useful vehicle data such 
as altitude, horizontal displacement, attitude, velocity, 
visible horizon and so on. The considered test case 
includes an SSTO vehicle with mass of 5000 kg[10],  
wing area of 6.65 m², and max thrust of 51.6 kN. The 
liftoff speed is 98 m/s to a parabolic flight with 
engine cutoff after 190 seconds. As shown in Fig. XII 
and Fig. XIII, the ascent profile is such as the vehicle 
reaches the altitude of about 100 km in less than five 
minutes, with an horizontal displacement of less than 
100 Km. Considering the  Decimomannu Military 
Airport as departure site, the visible horizon from the 
vehicle is shown in Fig. XIV. The attitude of the 
vehicle is shown in Fig. XV and the velocity profile 
in Fig. XVI. The used model is flexible enough that 
the same simulation can be run for a TSTO, setting up 
a two steps approach, a step for the first stage with an 
horizontal or vertical takeoff, and a step for the 
second one using as a starting point the moment it is 
released.  
 
Fig. XII: SSTO Ascent Profile versus time 
 
Fig. XIII: SSTO altitude profile versus displacement  
 
 
 
 
Fig. XIV: SSTO visible horizon at Decimomannu  
 
 
 
Fig. XV: Vehicle pitch angle versus time 
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Fig. XVI: Vehicle velocity profile versus time 
 
VII. REENTRY 
The need for a safer access to space imposes the 
review of operational capabilities and hence of design 
approach for manned reentry vehicles of next 
generation. Up to now several hypersonic shapes have 
been investigated for use in recoverable space 
systems. Initial efforts focused on low Lift-to-Drag 
ratio (L/D), as Apollo spacecraft. Systems such as the 
Space Shuttle, although flying at medium L/D (<1.5) 
ratio, have the important features of being reusable. 
Furthermore, a high L/D ratio increases the dimension 
of the so-called re-entry window, namely the set of 
values of velocity, flight path angle and altitude 
compatible with the re-entry on a runaway. This 
implies a significant increase of the operational 
flexibility, also in the perspective of a quick return for 
reuse. Furthermore, enhancing a hypersonic vehicle 
L/D ratio, effectively increases the footprint (cross 
range area) in which the vehicle can safely maneuver 
and land, even in presence of unforeseen reentry 
anomalies or constraints at the primary landing site 
like weather.The need for a high degree of 
atmospheric control capability leads to consider a 
Shuttle-like configuration, i.e. a re-entry space glider. 
A possible shape of the vehicle is shown in Fig.XVII.  
 
 
Fig. XVII: Possible Shape of the Re-entry Vehicle 
 
Specific simulations were carried out to prove the 
feasibility of the Spacegate spiral re-entry maneuver 
as described in [1] , as well as the gradual acquisition 
of the control by the pilot. For the present simulation, 
a lifting body with an aerodynamic efficiency 
approximately equal to 1 has been considered. The 
mass has been set to 7600 Kg, whereas the lifting 
surface has been set equal to 18 m
2
. Both the lift and 
drag coefficients changes according to the angle of 
attack, through a first order expression, leading to a 
maximum value of 0,51.  
In the perspective of a manned re-entry mission, the 
following constraints have been taken into account: 
Maximum load factor equal to 3g, maximum dynamic 
pressure of 30 kPa, maximum instantaneous heat flux 
(Sutton & Graves model) of 2.0 MW/m
2
. For the 
purposes of the present study, an open loop guidance 
has been implemented, based on the angle of attack 
and bank angle variation for Shuttle-like, re-entry 
vehicles.  The angle of attack is assumed constant and 
equal to 43° until the reaching of the condition 
suitable for the spiral re-entry. To prove the 
feasibility of the “SpaceGate” spiral manoeuver, 
specific simulations with a dedicated orbit propagator 
have been carried out. According to the described 
vehicle’s characteristics, the dynamic conditions 
necessary to start the spiral manoeuver occur at 44.3 
km of altitude and a velocity relative to the flux equal 
to 4084 m/s. These conditions are obtained by 
imposing a maximum lateral acceleration equal to 1.7 
g during the spiral trajectory. After a first roll-
reversal, with an instantaneous curvature radius 
ranging between 500 and 1000 km, the “SpaceGate” 
spiral manoeuver is triggered. It should be noted that 
the spiral arch is not entirely executed. The high bank 
angle, held constant during the first part of the spiral, 
results in a decreased flight path angle as well as 
increased descending rate, and in turn, the 
exponential growth of the atmosphere density causes 
an abrupt reduction of the curvature radius. A more 
gradual shrinkage of the trajectory can be driven 
through an advanced guidance of the bank and 
incidence angles. The simulation output is shown in 
Fig.XVIII through Fig.XXI, that provide the main 
features of the re-entry trajectory. In particular, Fig. 
XVIII is relevant to the mechanical and thermal stress 
experienced by the vehicle during reentry, Fig. XIX 
and Fig. XX provide the velocity and altitude profile, 
and Fig.XXI shows the Ground Track displacement at 
reentry. Thermal fluxes, dynamic pressure and load 
factor appear below the specified thresholds. 
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Fig.XVIII: Mechanical and thermal stress at reentry 
 
Fig. XIV: Velocity Profile versus altitude 
 
 
 
Fig. XXI: Ground track displacement at reentry 
 
 
 
 
VIII. POST MISSION  
Post Mission Operations start from the flight 
vehicle arriving at the landing facility and taxiing to 
the landing and recovery area, where post-flight 
safing procedures occur, and crew and  passengers are 
off-loaded and recovered. The vehicle then should be 
moved to the vehicle processing and service bay, 
where the performance of the subsystems and 
equipment is verified and scheduled maintenance 
operations are performed. A Main Spacecraft Ground 
Operations facility is assumed to be the center of 
operations for pre-flight spacecraft preparation and 
post-flight spacecraft service. The facility should be 
designed to accomplish the fastest possible 
turnaround time from spacecraft recovery to next 
launch. Preventive maintenance and spacecraft 
systems checks should be performed in the Main 
Spacecraft Ground Operations Facility. For extensive 
check procedures, Spacecraft shall be towed off-line, 
to the maintenance area, where heavy maintenance, 
overhaul, and component replacement can be 
performed. 
 
IX. SPACEGATE CONTROL CENTER 
The proposed Spacegate Preliminary Architecture 
includes a Control Center function to support all the 
Prelaunch, Launch / Mission and Reentry operations. 
Continuous coordination with the Control Towers and 
ATC control shall be implemented during operations. 
The Center includes a Mission Control Center, 
handled by the Spaceflight control team, whose 
members represent each discipline, and report directly 
to the Mission Director. As an example, Fig. XXII 
shows the Mission Support Center located at the 
ALTEC premises in Torino, Italy. The Flight Control 
Team shall work together and shall have the proper 
skills to execute the flight timeline and address all 
contingency situations.  
 
 
Fig.XXII: The Mission Support Center (MSC) at 
ALTEC 
 
The following disciplines have preliminary been 
identified to be part of the Spacegate Control Center; 
further refinement analysis is required to better define 
the positions and possibly include additional 
disciplines: 
Fig.XIII: Mechanical and thermal stress during reentry i . XIX: Velocity Profile v rsus altitude 
 
Fig. XX: Altitude versus time diagram 
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Mission Director: Leader of the flight control team. 
Responsible for overall Vehicle mission for all 
decisions regarding safe, expedient flight conduct 
Operations Director and Safety: Head of the 
ground segment operation team and responsible for 
the overall operations of the ground segment. Safety 
position is also included 
Vehicle Operations Manager: Responsible for the 
monitoring of the vehicle parameters and the 
provision of the actual status of the vehicle during the 
flight phases. He is supported by the Flight Control 
Team. 
Trajectory Officer / Flight Dynamics Officer: Plans 
maneuvers and monitors trajectory in conjunction 
with Guidance, Navigation and Control 
Ground Controller: Directs maintenance and 
operation activities, affecting Mission Control 
hardware, software and support facilities, coordinates 
spaceflight tracking and data network and tracking 
satellite system.  
Propulsion Officer: Monitors and evaluate the 
propulsion and maneuvering systems, during all 
phases of flight, and manages propellants and other 
consumables available for maneuvers 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control: Monitors all 
Spacecraft guidance, navigation and control systems, 
notifies Mission  Director and crew of possible  abort 
situations, advises crew regarding guidance 
malfunctions. Ensures that the onboard navigation 
and onboard guidance computer software executes the 
proper tasks to accomplish mission objectives 
Maintenance, Mechanical and Crew Systems 
Engineer: Monitors the Spacecraft structural and 
mechanical systems, and follows use of onboard crew 
hardware and in-flight equipment maintenance  
Power Systems Engineer: Monitors cryogenic levels 
for fuel cells, electrical generation and distribution 
systems and vehicle lighting.  
Data Processing System Engineer: Determines 
status of data processing system including the 
onboard general purpose computers, flight-critical 
and launch data lines, the displays, onboard mass 
memory and software 
Flight Activities Officer: Plans and supports crew 
activities, checklists, procedures and schedules. 
Develops the attitude timeline for most efficient 
pointing of the Spacecraft mission objectives.  
Environmental  Systems Engineer: Monitors cabin 
environmental control system, cooling systems, and 
cabin pressure control systems 
Instrumentation and Communications Systems 
Engineer: Plans and monitors in-flight 
communications and instrumentation systems 
configurations.  
CAPCOM Vehicle Communicator: Primary 
communicator between flight control and crew.  
X. SAFETY  
X.I Spaceport Safety 
One of the main driving Spaceport evaluation  
criteria is making sure that the risk to the public, to 
personnel at the take-off and landing area, and to 
national resources is minimized to the greatest degree 
possible. Launch/takeoff risk definition should be 
established based on a standard of a collective risk 
level of not more than 30 casualties in 1 million (30 x 
10
-6
) for the general public and not more than 300 
casualties in 1 million (300 x 10
-6
) for essential 
launch/takeoff area personnel.  
The basic standard for the general public is not more 
than the risk voluntarily accepted in normal day-to-
day activities.  
Spaceport Safety department shall review, approve, 
monitor, and impose safety holds when necessary, on 
all prelaunch and launch operations to ensure that the 
hazards associated with propellants and other 
hazardous systems do not expose the general public to 
risks greater than those considered acceptable by 
national law and documents. The Spacegate concept 
is based on maximization of usage of existing sites, 
but the selected sites for suborbital operations shall 
undergo the process of Safety risk management as a 
one time, early system assessment activity, aimed at 
initial identification of hazards in all departments and 
operational activities of the spaceport, including those 
related to suborbital vehicle operators and supporting 
entities that operate at and directly around the 
spaceport; once hazards are identified, analysis and 
assessment of the risks posed by these hazards shall 
be conducted, as well as identification of controls to 
mitigate the risks to as low a level as is reasonably 
practicable; in this way, hazards are prevented from 
evolving in accidents or serious incidents. This 
process may eventually lead to some specific 
infrastructure improvements and implementation of 
changes. Safety risk management provides the initial 
frame of reference against which assurance of safety 
is conducted on a continuous basis. The identified 
hazards should cover both flight safety of crew and 
passengers, and safety of the people on the ground. 
The following operational activities should be 
considered when developing the Safety risk 
management process:  
 Spaceport operator core operational activities, i.e. 
the support to the takeoff operation and landing 
of suborbital vehicles. 
 The provision of Air Traffic Management on the 
surface of the spaceport and in the vicinity of the 
spaceport (reflecting the range envelope of the 
suborbital vehicle) while airborne, especially 
when this service is provided by the spaceport 
operator.  
 The maintenance of the spaceport. 
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 Support activities to the spaceport, e.g. servicing 
and ground-handling of the suborbital vehicle, 
transporting crew and passengers to the 
suborbital vehicle. 
 The storage, handling and transportation of solid 
and liquid propellants. Risk controls should 
include safe distances between different 
explosive hazard facilities, and between an 
explosive hazard facility and public areas. Also, 
the public should not be exposed to hazards due 
to the initiation of explosives by lightning. 
 
Special emphasis shall be given to the Spaceport  
Safety Critical Systems that shall include all airborne 
and ground subsystems of the Spaceport Safety 
System. The Spaceport Safety System consists of 
airborne and ground flight termination systems 
(FTSs), airborne and ground Range Tracking Systems 
(RTSs), and the Telemetry Data Transmitting System 
(TDTS). All Spaceport Safety critical systems shall 
be designed to ensure that no single point of failure, 
including software, will deny the capability to 
monitor and terminate or result in the inadvertent 
termination of a launch vehicle or payload, as 
applicable.  
The Spaceport shall ensure that all personnel, located 
on site or on any supporting site, within the Spaceport 
area, are provided protection from the hazards 
associated with Spaceport operations.  
There are no explicit regulations concerning Safety 
Management System for Spaceports however, for 
example, the FAA-AST have stipulated that 
Spaceports have to obtain an Environmental 
Assessment (EA).  Within the EA there are limited 
requirements concerning health and safety and 
handling of rocket propellants; however this does not 
constitute a formal Safety Management System 
(SMS,) as required of existing airports, and hence it is 
important that the Spaceports should have a formal 
Safety Management System (SMS), tailored to the 
requirements of suborbital vehicles and their unique 
operations. A Safety Management System (SMS) 
should ensure that all departments of the spaceport 
are continually aware of the safety hazards present, 
are able to prioritize these hazards based on safety 
risk, act if the safety hazard is too high by mitigating 
the risk, and assure that the mitigation action works.  
The Safety Management System (SMS) does not 
necessarily generate the need for an additional set, or 
duplication of documents. The SMS requirements 
should complement the procedures already 
documented, especially for aerodromes extending 
their operation to suborbital launches. 
There are four components of an SMS: 
 
• Safety Policy and Objectives 
• Safety Risk Management 
• Safety Assurance 
• Safety Promotion 
 
X.II Take-off  and landing Safety 
Take off trajectories shall be developed 
considering the location of potential abort landing 
sites, and avoiding hazardous terrain, such as 
mountain ranges that may complicate search and 
rescue operations in the event of emergency return-to-
base. For example, the Decimomannu site appears to 
offer proper terrain and surround conditions favorable 
to suborbital operations. Specific screenshots of the 
Decimomannu runway are shown in Fig. XXIII and 
Fig. XXIV. 
 
 
FigXXIII:  Decimomannu runway (Google Earth) 
 
 
 
Fig.XXIV: Decimomannu runway and surroundings 
(Google Earth) 
 
Proper alternate to takeoff and alternate to landing 
sites shall be selected to ensure safety in case of 
emergency, malfunctions or bad weather conditions. 
In the case of Decimomannu airport, the civil airport 
of Cagliari Elmas may be a proper alternate airport. 
For ferried launch vehicles or launch vehicles capable 
of flying under jet power, trajectories shall be planned 
such as the engine is ignited over sparsely or 
unpopulated areas and away from air traffic.  
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X.III Aircraft Safety 
It is assumed that the aircraft used is already 
certified for the Suborbital Spaceflight, including the 
fulfillment of all Safety Requirements related to the 
Airframe, Propulsion and Systems. 
 
X.IV Flight Crew Safety / Survival Systems 
Suborbital vehicle design involves unique features 
and innovative fabrication processes coupled with the 
latest engineering analysis to produce vehicles flying 
beyond Mach 3 to reach 100 km and above. The 
vehicle ground and flight test numbers will be low 
and they will not be certified per their orbital (and 
aviation) counterparts. Therefore during the early 
development and commercial operating phase, the 
analysis confidence levels will be lower than certified 
vehicles. Additionally the designs are different using 
various launch methods, different propellants, engines 
etc. and so for commercial human suborbital 
spaceflight the protection of flight crew and 
spaceflight participants should be analysed effectively 
not only for normal flight conditions but also for 
abnormal and emergency conditions. In particular, 
deterioration of a contingency situation can continue 
until the point when it becomes necessary to escape 
or abandon the spacecraft to ensure the survival of the 
crew and participants on board. Contingencies 
scenarios shall be considered to address relevant 
flight personnel survival capabilities. These should 
include system failures and emergencies such as fire, 
collision, toxic atmosphere, decreasing atmospheric 
pressure and medical emergencies among others.  
The Vehicle design and operations shall allow for 
safe abort, including as necessary flight personnel 
escape and rescue capabilities, for all flight phases 
starting with takeoff operations. Survival Systems, in 
this sense are related to the vehicle only, and provide 
escape, safe haven and emergency egress. Survival 
Equipment include both personnel life support and 
protective equipment (such as spacesuits, personal 
oxygen systems) and also equipment on board to 
assist in emergencies, such as fire-fighting and 
medical capabilities. 
The escape system, including any sensor, equipment 
and circuitry shall comply with the requirements of 
Design to Tolerate Failures and of Design for 
Minimum Risk. Possible survival and escape systems 
shall include: 
 Vehicle Suborbital Parachute 
 Occupant Parachutes 
 Protection Space Suit 
 Ejection seats 
 Survival Pods 
 Encapsulated Seat 
 Specific Inflight Crew Escape System 
Fig. XXV shows a typical concept of crew survival 
escape system 
 
 
 
Fig.XXV:  Concept of Crew Survival Escape System 
 
XI. REGULATORY 
XI.I General 
Europe applies to suborbital aircrafts the ICAO 
definition found in Annex 8 of the Chicago 
Convention, “an aircraft is any machine that can 
derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions 
of the air other than the reactions of the air against 
the earth’s surface.”   As a result, suborbital vehicles 
would fall under the legal regime pertaining to 
aircraft, necessitating certificates of airworthiness as 
per the rules set forth by the EASA and ICAO. 
Hence, there are two distinct differences between the 
US and European models. While the US regime is 
based upon licensing, in which the operator bears full 
responsibility for operations, the European centers 
rely upon certification, since the certifying authority 
bears some portion of responsibility; hence, Europe 
treats suborbital flight as predominantly a part of 
aviation, bringing it into the ICAO regime for 
international air law. The overall schematic of 
involved organizations is shown in Fig. XXVI 
 
 
Fig. XXVI: Regulatory Organisms  
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In the USA, the XCOR Lynx vehicle [9] will 
operate as an FAA AST-licensed suborbital reusable 
launch vehicle. XCOR already has successfully 
passed the AST licensing process with an earlier 
vehicle concept, and is actively involved in the 
development of the statutory and regulatory 
framework within which Lynx will operate. Lynx will 
have aircraft-like operations up to four times per day 
from any licensed spaceport with a 2,400 meter 
(7,900 ft) runway, suitable abort options, fast 
turnaround (two hours), low maintenance intervals 
(designed for 40 flights before preventive 
maintenance action), and low cost operations. Lynx 
operates under visual flight rules (VFR). In Europe 
the EASA’s jurisdiction ends when the activity is 
occurring in outer space. At that point, Member 
States’ national responsibility takes over, in 
accordance with Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 
requiring States to authorize and continually 
supervise the activities of their nationals in space.   
To perform an intercontinental point-to-point 
suborbital trajectory, a vehicle must be designed to 
reach the necessary speed and manage the thermal 
environment of transiting the atmosphere both during 
takeoff and landing. In order to carry passengers 
through international borders, the spacecraft should 
have undergone an internationally accepted 
certification process and comply with normal aviation 
legislation.  
 
XI.II Airspace / Air Traffic Management  
The European Regulation (EC) needs to 
harmonize the safety element as applied to 
aerodrome/spaceports and Air Traffic Management 
(ATM)/(ANS) and define the implementation rules, 
including the safety requirements.  Currently, 
ATM/ANS for suborbital flight in the US is handled 
on an as needed basis but will have to integrate within 
the existing ATM/ANS system in use for aviation. 
Sub-orbital operations to and from the same spaceport 
are likely to be operated through a variety of 
spacecraft systems, operating in different ways, flying 
several profiles and requiring various airspace 
solutions to support such operations. Specific airspace 
solutions would need to be designed on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account particular system 
requirements.  
In same case a cylinder of Special Airspace, with a 
radius of 10–20 nautical miles, would be enough to 
allow a typical launch and recovery profile, avoiding 
the necessity for large volumes of airspace. The flight 
profile, proposed in this paper for example, will likely 
include a gradual circling descent – unlike the space 
shuttle, which flew a steep straight-in approach, 
operating at an 18°–20° angle on final approach. 
Point to point intercontinental spaceflight, at 
suborbital level, is still theoretical. With no operating 
example the level of information, regarding airspace 
requirements, is minimal. If operating from an 
existing busy commercial aerodrome, the integration 
with general air traffic, without the need to employ 
Special Airspace, would be essential.  
Suborbital flights operating from Point to Point will 
generate a need for en-route separation. However, 
beyond the departure and approach phases, separation 
with other en-route traffic would not be necessary, 
due to the altitude at which a spacecraft will operate. 
There will be a requirement for the launch 
operator/spaceport operator to ensure that the required 
airspace/ATC procedures are in place. These 
arrangements should include the allocation of 
appropriate radio frequencies for communication with 
the ATC. The frequencies would be assigned by the 
relevant aviation authority, through international 
agreement, for operations extending into outer space. 
This system is already in place through ICAO, in a 
manner that will ensure compliance with the 
International Telecommunication Radio regulations. 
 
XI.III Regulatory in Italy 
In Italy specific very important steps are being 
carried out to bring up to speed the regulatory system, 
at least initially to allow starting of suborbital 
experimental activities. On March 12
th
 2014 at 
Washington DC, in the occasion of the Open 
Workshop ‘The New Frontiers for Research & 
Aerospace Technologies’, Hypersonic and re-entry 
vehicles, organized with the strong support of Colonel 
Roberto Vittori, FAA and ENAC (The Italian 
Authority of Civil Aviation) signed a Memorandum 
of Cooperation in the development of Commercial 
Space Transportation, and a follow-on working 
agenda was generated identifying specific areas of 
interest. One of these areas was the setup of a proper 
suborbital flights regulatory strategy, and additional 
aspects such as licensing versus aviation-like, specific 
ad-hoc approach and the relevant legal requirements, 
liability, insurance issues. A few days later, a second 
Memorandum of Cooperation was signed between 
ENAC and the Italian Air Force.   An increased 
interest in Italy toward the suborbital activities was 
apparent during the International Symposium: 
‘’Hypersonic: from 100,000 to 400,000 ft’’ 
held in Rome, Italy, on June 30th-July 1st 2014. 
 
XII. CONCLUSIONS 
Basing upon the Spacegate Operation Concept 
and the initial set of Top Level Operation 
Requirements   derived during earlier studies, specific  
preliminary aspects relevant to the development of a 
suborbital end-to-end mission scenario have been 
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evaluated, and some important driving operating and 
safety aspects have been addressed.  Specific ground 
sites in Italy are considered potentially suitable for 
suborbital operations because of favorable aspects, 
such as surrounding landscape, vicinity of cities or 
populated areas (noise and debris impact), weather, 
airport dimensions, commercial and scheduled flights, 
available runways and dimensions, available Navaids, 
airspace, military activities. The execution of 
suborbital activities requires the development of a 
proper Ground Segment that has to include a Control 
Center with the associated specific functions. A 
SSTO take off concept with horizontal takeoff and an 
atmospheric reentry with horizontal landing, 
according to  the typical Spacegate spiral shaped 
maneuver were evaluated through the development 
and execution of specific simulations; the  
simulations results show for the defined test case the 
vehicle ascent profile and attitude data during both 
takeoff and reentry,  as well as the feasibility of the 
spiral reentry maneuver that should improve the pilot 
control capability. The various Safety aspects were 
analyzed, starting from the driving criteria to select a 
Spaceport and put in place a Safety Risk Management 
process, through the guidelines to planning the proper 
takeoff and landing trajectories. Special emphasis has 
been given to flight crew safety and survival systems 
that largely affect the design and operations of 
suborbital vehicles. The implementation of the 
suborbital flights in Italy will be based, at least 
initially, on the follow on of the Memorandum of 
Cooperation between FAA and ENAC and the 
subsequent one between ENAC and the Italian Air 
Force. The activities will somehow refer to the 
current FAA approach for regulatory and certification 
process.  
 
 
ACRONYMS LIST 
 
A  
ABN 
ALS 
Aerodrome beacon 
Approach lighting system 
ALTEC Advanced Logistics Technology 
Engineering Center 
AMSL 
ANS 
Above mean sea level 
Air Navigation Services 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
 
C 
 
COMSTAC 
 
CRI 
Commercial Space Transportation 
Advisory Committee 
Certification Review Item 
CTR Control 
 
D 
 
DARPA 
 
E 
Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency 
EA Environmental Assessment 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
ELV Expandable Launch Vehicle 
ENAC Ente Nazionale Aviazione Civile 
ENAV Ente Nazionale assistenza al Volo 
ESA European Space Agency 
EVA 
 
Extra-Vehicular Activity 
F 
FAA 
 
Federal Aviation Administration 
FAA/AST FAA Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation 
H  
HAF 
HIRL 
HJ 
HR 
High Altitude Flight 
High intensity runway edge lights 
Sunrise to Sunset 
Hours 
HTHL Horizontal Take-off, Horizontal 
Landing Hazardous Materials 
I 
IATA 
 
International Air Transport 
Association 
ICAO International Civil Aviation 
Organization 
ISO International Organization for 
Standardization 
ISS International Space Station 
IT 
 
L 
Information Technology 
 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
 
M 
MoD 
 
 
Ministry of Defence 
NAS National Air Space System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
NASTAR National Aerospace Training And 
Research Centre 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 
NAVAIDS Navigational Aid System 
NLA 
NM 
New, Large Aircraft 
Nautical Miles 
 
O 
 
OST 
 
P 
PAPI 
Outer Space Treaty 
 
 
Precision approach path indicator 
 
R 
REDL 
 
 
Runway edge lights 
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RLV Reusable Launch Vehicle 
RWY Runway 
 
S 
 
SFC Surface 
SSTO Single Stage to Orbit 
 
T 
 
TAR Terminal area surveillance radar 
TSTO      Two Stage to Orbit 
 
U 
 
UN United Nations 
UNL Unlimited 
 
V 
 
VTHL Vertical Take-off, Horizontal 
Landing 
VTVL Vertical Take-off, Vertical 
Landing 
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